Published On: Sat, Sep 15th, 2018

30 years for Naa’imur Zakariyah Rahman: the disadvantages of being initiated into ISIS by the FBI and MI5

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Once again a judge has upheld the “dangerous rubber duck” principle in a terror case. If the reader is not aware, the “dangerous rubber duck” principle, a term that is in the process of being coined here at FBEL, is when a fantasy held by a mentally deranged or grotesquely deluded individual, regarding his capability to cause damage in what is (or would be) actually a harmless attack, is validated by a court. Repeated affirmation of the “dangerous rubber duck” principle, in the name of creating terror statistics to justify spending on security apparatus, must force right-thinking people to reject the criminal legal system of the Crown (the State) – another example of how the British Establishment, ironically, is provoking a demise in its authority while simultaneously rushing madly to create a complete control grid.

The “rubber duck” principle has been formulated through observations made of the “Cartoon Jihadi”, Ahmed Hassan, a man jailed for what was in fact a pyrotechnic special effect set off (by others) on a London Underground train at the Parsons Green station. The “bomb” that he was said to have tried to have constructed would not have burned in the same way – please see the FBEL articles on the incident, and on the explosive, TATP.

If one tries to kill another person with a rubber duck, and fails because the tool for murder is clearly not equal to the task, then what does the attempt amount to – what does the intent amount to? The anwer is nothing. On the other hand, if we imagine that a rubber duck is a credible instrument to commit murder so that we can make the intent meaningful, are we not just sharing in the fantasy of the perpetrator? Shouldn’t a judge, and a court, be of sound mind so that he and it can come to good decisions and uphold the law, rather than be as delusional as the suspect and open up the way to chaos? What good is he as a judge, then, in the latter case? What good is a justice system if it reaffirms the mistaken beliefs of fantasists – and turns them into social and legal facts – rather than assert reality?  If it does not insist on truth, then it is worse than no good, it is downright dangerous.

The key issue to grasp is the redundancy of intent when capability is zero. But perhaps this doesn’t quite do it justice, so here is the same idea put another way: if the crime is impossible to commit in the manner intended, because the manner intended is ludicrously insufficient, then the intention counts for nought. Essentially, through the fake terror element of its control grid, the British Government has ushered in an age of a kind of thought-crime, or a pre-crime, where what could only be unrealisable fantasy is being punished as an act committed – and of course, the State has had a hand in bridging the two otherwise vastly estranged states of being.

The latest example of this sort of travesty involved a Naa’imur Zakariyah Rahman, who, at the end of August 2018, was jailed for no less than 30 years after being convicted of preparing acts of terrorism. Notice the operative word: “preparing”. The charges arraigned against this fellow were as follows (copied verbatim from the Metropolitan Police’s site):

= within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court with the intention of committing acts of terrorism engaged in conduct in preparation for giving effect to that intention, contrary to section 5(1)(a) and (3) Terrorism Act 2006;

= within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court with the intention of assisting Mohammad Aqib Imran to commit acts of terrorism engaged in conduct in preparation for giving effect to his intention of committing acts of terrorism, contrary to section 5(1)(b) and (3) Terrorism Act 2006.

Rahman was found guilty on the first count (the details of which are examined further below), but, and the regular FBEL reader will not be surprised to learn, admitted his own guilt of the second. We have learnt to suspect by now, have we not, that terror patsies will plead guilty to charges that might otherwise send a show-trial off the rails by dint of being too tricky a test to pass. Indeed, in this case the jury, accordingly discharged, could not reach a decision on the primary accusation levelled against Rahman’s co-defendant, Mohammad Aqib Imran; ultimately, then, Rahman owned up to assisting a crime that could not be proven to have taken place. That he would have had ineffective defence lawyers is indicative of a terror-show trial in the UK. Another distinguishing feature of the same was that the trial took place in that black hole in the legal system, the Old Bailey – the scene of conviction for the likes of Thomas Mair, Michael Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo, and Ahmed Hassan.

The Rahman case is unlike those of the people mentioned above, for the plot he was involved in did not come to fruition; and yet it is incredibly important for understanding those cases, and for appreciating the real nature of “terror” as it is being “countered” by UK Government: while it is the activated, and executed terror plots that cause death and injury, and weeks-on-end corporate-media coverage, it is the “foiled” terror plots, such as Rahman’s, that are in multitude in terms of comparative numbers of incidents. Foiled terror plots are the ones police claim to have prevented (from coming to the public’s attention), and they are numerous to the extent that they, not the spectacular attacks, provide justification for counter-terror measures and Government security control grid, and all the money that is spent on it.

In 2016 it came to the attention of some corporate-media in the USA that most terror plots in that country of the “foiled” variety had actually been instigated by the FBI (arguably, since the Boston bombing of 2013, there hasn’t been a terror plot in the US that has not been foiled). In a nutshell, the usual process of these FBI stings goes like this:

In many cases, agents will seek out people who have somehow demonstrated radical views, and then coax them into plotting an act of terrorism — often providing weapons and money. Before the suspects can carry out their plans, though, they’re arrested.

(Source).

Others say that those arrested have actually been entrapped, amongst them attorney Stephen Downs, who told Business Insider (from whence the above extract was taken):

The government has developed a technique of engaging targets in conversations of a somewhat provocative nature, and then trying to pick up on things the target says, which might suggest illegal activity — and then trying to push them into pursuing those particular activities… Very often, they [the FBI] target people who are genuinely psychotic, who are taking medication.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, US judges have never undermined the War on Terror narrative, and “no case has ever been thrown out on the basis of this kind of entrapment”. However, there have been expressions of concern, and for an example of such Business Insider quoted Judge Colleen McMahon of the US District Court in Manhattan, who, in 2011, said of the case she was officiating: “I believe beyond a shadow of a doubt that there would have been no crime here, except the government instigated it, planned it and brought it to fruition”.

It doesn’t require a great leap of logic to arrive at a conclusion that a counter-terror agency can just as easily set up a terror event that does go ahead as it can one that is foiled. At FBEL, when observing in detail the official stories regarding the terror acts supposedly executed by Darren Osborne, Thomas Mair, Michael Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo, and Ahmed Hassan amongst others, the evidence has been found to indicate the inevitable hand of British Government in the engineering of what always develop into politically crucial events for the purpose of advancing an agenda: the crisis that is never let go to waste is also the crisis that has to be engineered in the first place. All the while too, it was felt that circumstantial evidence of British security services being responsible for terror was indicated by the phenomenon of FBI instigation of foiled terror plots. A such-like example may have existed before and not have been known to the author, but as far as FBEL is concerned, the Rahman case now provides definitive proof that British intelligence agencies and law enforcement participate in the same instigation of foiled terror plots on the UK side of the Atlantic.

It was revealed at Rahman’s trial that he was essentially recruited on the internet by FBI agents pretending to be ISIS. He was then put in contact with “an MI5 team of online role players who convinced him that they were genuine IS[IS] figures”. Soon after taking delivery of a jacket he thought was stuffed with explosive, and also of a pressure cooker pan rigged out to look like something Rahman could imagine was a bomb, the would-be useful idiot was arrested.

The individual who officiated at the trial, one Haddon-Cave, said “I am sure that at all material times Rahman believed the devices to be real and capable of causing serious harm.” Obviously aware that his trial could be seen as an abuse of Rahman’s rights, Haddon-Cave felt that he had to pre-emptively deal with the issue of entrapment (source as linked to above):

He added that the undercover officers involved in the case were “scrupulous” at all times and Rahman was the “instigator and author” of his own actions.

As if in support, the BBC home affairs correspondent, Dominic Casciani, published a little detail that suggested that Rahman was indeed the driving force (source as linked to above):

“I want to do a suicide bomb on Parliament,” Rahman told the MI5 role players.

“I want to attempt to kill Theresa May. All I need now is a sleeper cell to lay low for now.”

Of course, how these expressions of intent were got out of Rahman, and whether or not they were obtained in the fashion described by Stephen Downs, is not included in the corporate-media reporting that the author can find – unsurprisingly. However, judging by his mug shot, Rahman doesn’t look like he is the sharpest tool in the shed, and therefore may have been a prime candidate according to the criteria explained by Stephen Downs. Evidently, Rahman’s mental faculties, or any other deficiency that could have been exploited, were not brought up by his useless defence counsel – this would be par for the course.

Rahman

Moreover, we must return to the question, and the big problem (for a British Establishment that is so keen to put mentally ill people in jail as terrorists) of how Rahman could commit a crime which he wasn’t capable of. When he was charged, his offence was explained in layman’s terms by the corporate-media; first the Guardian:

According to the charge, he conducted reconnaissance of the target location, recorded a pledge of allegiance, purchased a rucksack, delivered a rucksack and bag to be fitted with an improvised explosive device, and collected it “with a view to committing attacks against persons in the UK”.

ITV explained it like this:

Rahman is alleged to have planned to bomb the security gates outside the Westminster residence before attacking Number 10 with a knife and suicide vest in a bid to kill Theresa May.

By the time Rahman had had his trial, the BBC reckoned he had been found guilty of this:

Rahman had planned to detonate a bomb at the gates of Downing Street and then kill Theresa May with a knife or gun.

Notice, the plot now involved a choice of hand weapon – possibly a complete invention for public consumption to make Rahman appear dangerous and not actually the harmless fantasist that he would have remained had he not been picked on by the FBI. The dishonesty of the BBC aside, how would Rahman execute phase two of the plan if the first phase, upon which it was dependent, could never have succeeded because the bomb was a dud? For it is surely evident that the plot, according to how the Establishment has presented it to us, involved a first detonation to gain entry to 10 Downing Street, where Rahman would then fend off assailants with his knife (or a gun) until he could deliver his suicide present to Theresa May. Again we ask, how could phase two occur if the security gates could never have been blown out of the way?

Naturally, Haddon-Cave had to join in the fantasy in order to iron out the big flaw. Rahman, he said, had been “told and believed” (via the BBC) that the rucksack bomb given to him was “capable of causing casualties on a scale comparable to those caused at the Manchester Arena”. Here, then, is the answer to our question: the first bomb would have blown everything up, so Rahman didn’t in fact need to believe that he needed to infiltrate Number 10. All that was required to send him down was faith in the first big blast. What sort of a plan is it when execution means altering it in practice? It is no plan, and a reminder of the Ariana Grande concert (false flag) has nothing to do with putting Rahman behind bars, and everything to do with justifying the doing of it. It is merely placing a stanchion of fantasy scenario to shore up another that has been identified as not being possible. It amounts to a court of law reduced to peddling a narrative to maintain a grand illusion of terror.

In other cases, where a bomber has supposedly constructed his own device, there has been an issue about testing by a plot’s orchestrator to discover the effectiveness of the explosive material, and having proof that a so-called bomber could know if his bomb would do what he intended. At the crux of the issue is the matter of redundancy of intent by incapability. Rahman is a “bomber” who could not have tested his explosive material – therefore he would have been more ignorant of his potential impact than even was Ahmed Hassan, who didn’t test his own supposed home-made bomb to know that it just could not have worked. Hassan’s bomb only worked in the collective public imagination, generated by a court case and corporate-media. If Hassan had undergone a proper trial as a bomber (putting aside his being a bag-carrying patsy), his state of delusion would have been discovered, and it would not have been validated. Just because Rahman was a potential bomber on the reassurances about his tools given to him by others, he should have been found no less delusional than Hassan. Indeed, it could be said of Rahman that his delusion was created by his MI5 handlers. His decision to be supplied with the means by which to execute a bomb-attack totally depended on the information given to him by these other parties. The scenario is not hard to imagine. Rahman wants a bomb, or is offered one. It will detonate, he is told, in order to tempt him to take delivery. It is clear, then, that he couldn’t have proceeded to the final stages of “his” plot without the essential assistance of MI5. It’s not just about providing a so-called bomb, but also – and crucially – supplying the delusion that it would work. In supplying Rahman with belief, MI5 was central to him wanting to act out his ideas. How is this not entrapment?

Perhaps the most scandalous part of the Rahman case is how, at the time of his arrest, MI5 appeared to be telling politicians, and thus the wider public, of his organic recruitment by terrorists:

The plot was revealed to the Cabinet yesterday by Andrew Parker, the head of MI5, who also told ministers that security services have foiled nine terrorist attacks on the UK in the last year….

Addressing the Cabinet, Mr Parker reportedly said Isis had been defeated in Syria and Iraq but was continuing to orchestrate attacks on the UK. Militants are increasingly using social media to try communicate with would-be attackers, he said.

After the meeting, Ms May’s spokesman said: ”The Prime Minister led thanks to the tireless work of staff at MI5 to combat the unprecedented terrorist threat.

“Cabinet ministers heard that while Daesh suffered major defeats in Iraq and Syria, this did not mean the threat is over. Rather it is spreading to new areas, including trying to encourage attacks in the UK and elsewhere via propaganda on social media.”

We won’t know exactly what the Cabinet was told about Rahman’s case, but the implication is that it was cited in conjunction with the effect of propaganda coming from ISIS out of Syria and Iraq. This was MI5’s public face when in reality whatever Rahman had actually been looking at on the internet resulted in his coming into communication with an FBI agent, and then with MI5 in order to be exploited. Well, if the reader didn’t know already, our boys are ISIS. The unprecedented terror threat is MI5 pretending to be ISIS. And it is a complete mystery why this criminal organisation clings to its perceived right to rule (demonstrated by the tendency to act as it pleases outside the law) on the basis of its Masonry-framed imagined superiority, when it is not half as wise as occasional article writers on the internet, and the readers of the same, who can demonstrate and observe that, on the contrary, it is quite without honour or decency or any quality supposedly possessed by a ruling class (but then, the good shepherd is always a myth), and not deserving of its many privileges (there shouldn’t be any), and a long time past its own being brought to justice.

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