The “unification spoiling” grand public relations operation at Krasny Liman

In the map below, orange lines represent Russian claims about their control, yellow ones represent Ukrainian claims about Russian control.

The dotted orange line is from a Russian Ministry of Defence map shown in the briefing of 30th September. The dotted yellow line is from liveuamap (for Ukraine) for 29th September.

The solid orange line is from a Russian Ministry of Defence map as shown in its 2nd October briefing. The solid yellow line is how the Ukrainians are claiming the current situation on the same date.

When one looks at this graphic, the first thing that might occur is that the town of Krasny Liman, or Lyman, would naturally be amongst territory relinquished if the Russians decided to move from their first positions (dotted) to new ones in a north-easterly direction away from all that messy forested area. Of course, for the following Ukrainians, it would be a useful prop in another act of theatre.

Indeed, the author posits that another scheme was hatched by Ukraine’s wizarding masters, UK military intelligence, to be timed to coincide with the unification of the two ex-Ukrainian regions and the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics with Russia, that picked on Liman as the best hope – the only hope – across all theatres of staging something to attempt to disrupt the optics of Russian winning.  All the Ukrainians would perhaps need to do, as per the Human Wave style modus operandi they have been forced to employ, is get enough bodies at a fast enough rate into the territory in front and around Liman for the Russians to be persuaded to make that withdrawal. Given all that woodland to conceal themselves in, the Ukrainians could feasibly get close enough in large numbers to at least make it a possibility that will surely have occurred to the Russians. In fact, the Ukrainians wouldn’t have to attack Liman directly – and Russian MoD briefings but once mentioned such a thing in the days immediately preceding their withdrawal – to make them decide to vacate the area. As explained in countless other articles, the Russians have a way of warfare that looks to minimise casualties for the sake of efficiency, and one that is also done best at range by artillery fire. The Russians can fight the Ukrainians just as well and to the same ends by withdrawing their mobile units behind Liman: it’s no skin off their nose.

It’s a different matter altogether for the Ukrainians, however. Liman would create much needed headlines, even if it would prove very costly: a human wave attack involves having enough numbers in strength so that there is still an effective force after ranged evisceration by the defender. However, it plays to Ukraine’s strengths (their outnumbering of the Russians), and mitigates Ukraine’s weaknesses (the use of untrained soldiers and poor manoeuvrability due to lack of armoured vehicles), and theoretically negates Russia’s systematised technological advantage by unsophisticatedly attempting to fight on a toe-to-toe basis. Theoretically, of course, because it seemed that the Ukrainians still couldn’t get close enough.

On the 1st day of October, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that its forces had withdrawn from Krasny Liman, presumably during the 24 hours prior to the briefing in which the information was imparted. Please note the particular words used:

Due to the risk to be encircled, the allied forces were withdrawn from Krasny Liman to more advantageous frontiers.

Hopefully, an astute reader will notice that there is nothing in the evidence so far to suggest that, at any time, the Russians were actually surrounded at Krasny Liman, either in reality or “operationally” (and it remains doubtful that the Ukrainians can even achieve the latter).

And yet, the author saw at least two big name alternative media geopolitical “experts” insist that indeed the Russians had been trapped, most likely following the example of discreditable “pro-Russian” social media OSINT-mongers which are, either by payment or stupidity, the conduits of Ukrainian propaganda – of the very like of which was portrayed on the liveuamaps graphic, shown below, claiming to show how the situation was on 30th September. Take careful note, reader, of the actual weakness of the claim, given that it depends on Russia evacuating the land behind Liman, but not the settlement itself.  We will return to this subject later, because it is integral in the public relations operation that the Ukrainians were executing.

Of course, the other main concern of this piece is the cost in human life for a vanity project, and as we progress in this area, the reader is asked to note the inset image shown in the above graphic where the Ukrainian military in Drobysheve is on foot, and bear it in mind in relation to the discourse presented so far and also as it is to come.

As mentioned above, the Russian Ministry of Defence records how there was one attempted assault towards Krasny Liman in the days immediately preceding the Russian withdrawal, and this happened in the 24 hours prior to the briefing on 28th September. It involved elements of the Ukrainian 66th and 93rd mechanised brigades. The Russian MoD relates how the Ukrainians  were repelled with the loss of over 70 personnel, 4 tanks, 6 infantry combat (fighting) vehicles and 3 armoured vehicles.

Then, on 3rd October, the Russian MoD briefing reported losses to the 66th and 93rd over the course of the previous 78 hours: these amounted to over 900 servicemen dead. The same briefing detailed that the 66th had in the previous day lost “6 units of armoured equipment and 2 Grad MLRS combat vehicles”. Moreover, a separate briefing of the 1st of October stated that between the two of the said fighting groups, 5 tanks and 9 infantry fighting vehicles had also been lost. This amounts to nearly 1000 men killed, with material losses of 9 tanks, 17 IFVs, 3 armoured vehicles, plus the 6 pieces of other armoured stuff, between 27th September and 2nd October. And what is really important about this is that the damage was actually done after and as the Russians were withdrawing – and in so doing (as is clearly evident) luring the Ukrainians into a situation where they became incredibly vulnerable.

It doesn’t end there. Elements of the 66th and 93rd were in the (broad) vicinity of Krasny Liman and being hit by the Russians from the 18th September at Chervony Oskol or Studenok, Bogorodichnoye, Shchurovo and possibly Verkhnekamenskoye. The Russian MoD often reports groupings of attacks under one headline figure for casualties and this appears to be for reducing complexity. However, it means that it can only be said of losses specific to the 93rd and the 66th mechanised brigades at these places, as far as a student of the data is concerned, that they took a share of a particular overall number. A rough estimation of this share amounts to 231 personnel, 13 “units of military equipment”, 4 armoured vehicles, 2 tanks and 8 other motor vehicles.

In February, Forbes reported that the Ukrainian 92nd Mechanised Brigade had as components two tank battalions, and three battalions of mechanised infantry (using fighting vehicles and armoured carriers), with each battalion consisting of around 40 armoured vehicles and 400 troops. In 2017, Wikipedia reports, the 93rd Mechanised Brigade had one tank battalion, three battalions of mechanised infantry, and one battalion of motorised infantry. The casualties detailed above represent the wiping out of entire battalions – even the very ones just listed – certainly in terms of the manpower lost. Given that the vehicular element of these units was already going to be seriously degraded, one can suspect that the same thing can also be said in these terms. This, crucially, is damage sustained by the Ukrainians in the short duration of two weeks and is the true cost of the propaganda operation to repossess Krasny Liman.

But, of course, the 93rd and the 66th weren’t the only Ukrainian forces being attacked in this same theatre in the stated time period.

19th September: the 80th Airborne Assault Brigade near Seversk suffers a share of 200 men killed. 20th September: the 81st Airmobile Brigade, located either at Chervony Oskol or Studenok takes its share of 120 killed. 22nd September: the 17th Tank Brigade and the 80th Airborne Assault Brigade are hit at Seversk and lose 90 men and 15 pieces of “military equipment”. 23rd September: the 81st Airmobile Brigade near Kramatorsk suffers the loss of 220 men. Units of foreign mercenaries near Slavyansk and Ozyornoye lose over 100. Near Nikiforovka, a Buk-M1 self-propelled system is destroyed. 26th September: foreign fighters near Svyatogorsk lose 100 of their number. 29th September: 80 foreign fighters are killed near Nikolayevka (which the author understands is the one, from many similarly named settlements in Donetsk, that is in this theatre). 30th September: the 81st Airmobile Brigade and the 80th Airborne Assault Brigade near Kramatorsk lose 200 men and 23 units of military equipment (as well as 30 tonnes of ordnance). On 2nd October there is this:

Attacks launched by Russian Aerospace Forces at AFU units deployed near Yampolovka (Donetsk People’s Republic) at Krasny Liman direction have resulted in the elimination of over 200 Ukrainian servicemen, wounding 320, destroying 10 tanks and 25 infantry combat vehicles.

Interestingly, these forces are not identified, perhaps their constitution being too aggregated (from remnants) to pick it apart. This happened the same day, incidentally, as the Ukrainians lost 31 (precious remaining) tanks and 240 bodies in Kherson trying to run down the shore of the Dnipro River where it exits that large body of water against which is also the nuclear power plant at Enerhodar. Liveuamaps reports on it with another photograph of Ukrainian troops on foot that reached as far as a tiny settlement called Shevchenkivka, about 7 to 10 miles down the road from starting positions. Poor results indeed for what was evidently another very costly mad dash for propaganda (but par for the course in the Ukrainian war against Kherson fields).

Outside of the Nineteen Eighty Four land in which Western English-speaking peoples live,  the withdrawal from Krasny Liman by Russia was usual fare in this conflict where the end result is always a clobbering for the Ukrainians with the Russians deciding on whether this happens with blockage, or with allowing them to pass.

In the land where the Ministry of Truth is king, however, the engagement was being set up as a victory for Ukraine days ahead of an expected culmination and what was clearly envisioned as a major defeat for Russia. Indeed, it is clear that the anticipation by Mi7 (corporate-media) can also be called foreknowledge stemming from being in connivance with their military masters in the execution of a plan with a view to creating morale-boosting optics.

As this article explains even in its headline, the intention behind a plan to wangle Liman away from Russia was to obfuscate and spoil the events symbolised by a ceremony that took place on 30th September in Moscow where representatives of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhe signed contracts for the unification of those regions with Russia, or their being admitted into the Russian Federation. The intent could not have been more transparent in one particular Telegraph article, dated and timed to indicate it had been written after the occurrence of said ceremony on the same day. Using the “authority” of “Russian military bloggers”, this piece declared that Putin’s remarks about the new territory now being forever Russia was imminently about to be disproved as Liman was on the verge of being fully encircled with “between four and 6,000 Russian soldiers now fac[ing] capture or death”, or, “given Ukraine’s ability to bring accurate fire onto the highway [forming the only exit from the town]”, the Russians were “ likely to sustain heavy losses if they attempt to break out through the narrow salient.” The idea of near-encirclement, incidentally, was evidently provided by none other than Rybar (already established hereabouts as Ukrainian propaganda – and now officially outed as such) if it was the same one being cited by the Express in a “map showing Russian control confined to a narrowing salient”.

One only has to look at a map to see that Russia doesn’t need Liman as “a major hub” given that Donetsk and Lugansk can be served from Russia’s own borders, but this reason for why the impending loss was so immense to Russia – along with its being used (myopically, naturally, to suit the propaganda) to suggest that Russia’s new borders are not viable – was pitched in the article as such according superficially to liberal journalist credentials. Not far from the surface, however, was a lot of salivating at the prospect of all those Russians dead or made prisoner, and all for Mi7 to observe, record and transmit to its audience. The mania even provoked the “proper” Telegraph journalist into quoting the rubbishy OSINT-monger from whence the now proven to be fatuous and erroneous “salient” map had been got:

 “Nothing will stop Ukrainian formations developing an offensive deep into Russian territory,” Rybar, an authoritative Russian blogger, wrote of the possible imminent defeat.

Make no mistake, it wasn’t so much the repossession of Liman that was being anticipated, but a bigger show of Russian weakness in the form of bodies, dead no doubt preferred. It is such devastating evidence of Russia actively losing that the planners of this operation wanted to see, and empty settlements just wouldn’t cut the mustard. For their part, the Russians, thank goodness, were in no danger of cooperating, and were withdrawing – as mentioned above – even before the Telegraph article had been thought of. So much for Rybar maps – but then, Mi7 will already have known they are a constant lie.

As it turned out, therefore, the Russians spoiled the joint plans of Mi7 and the UK and Ukrainian militaries – and the inclusion of the following spitefulness in the Telegraph piece is an indication of the collective vexation: “With his troops fearing for their lives, [Putin under the golden chandeliers of St George’s Hall]… barely mentioned the Russian army, instead reserving the focus of his speech for ranting against the West.”

Perhaps aggravating the nervous fury is how the Russian move appears to have caught UK Government on the hop, because on the first day of October Sky News was behaving like the compere at a theatre between acts come out to explain that the next one was going to be delayed: “Ukraine ‘seems to have taken Lyman’”, is the headline that this division of Mi7 produced above a story on the matter. Nothing else than this stalling could so well demonstrate that corporate-media had lined up a campaign about a Russian version of Mariupol – so showing that the shoe was on the other foot – only for the Ukrainians with which they are in cahoots (via orders by UK Government) to fail to realise the reality on the ground. There’s no two ways about it – the Lyman thing was for show. And what must be painful for the wizards in UK intelligence is not that it failed militarily with all the Ukrainian muggle death – such a thing would have been expected – but that it also failed on its own propaganda terms.

There’s more failure ahead as the UK military apparatus that co-rules Britain, fearfully apprehensive of Russian mobilisation, produces nonsense about use of nuclear weapons in combination with tales about “Russian lines collapsing”† in the expectation that the global population will be so scared of apparent Russian desperation that they will guilt Putin into leaving Ukraine alone and as it were. Unfortunately for London, enough of the global population, including people in the countries where Mi7 operates, really does appear to know that Russia doesn’t need nuclear weapons to give London and its many operatives a much deserved and frankly strictly necessary comeuppance while there is opportunity to do it, and this is why there hasn’t been any serious international clamour to give peace a chance, nor will there be.

† Update, 7th October, 2022:

This has escalated today, the following from the BBC: