“Shot dead”: the jihadist who couldn’t take his knife out of the wrapper

The shooting dead of the “Streatham terrorist”, Sudesh Amman, earlier this month was the second extrajudicial killing, or summary execution, of an alleged knife-wielding jihadist in three months. The first was the killing of Usman Khan, who actually appeared to have been disarmed before he was shot. Footage of that incident showed a person, later announced as an “off duty policeman” (for which perhaps should be read “undercover cop”), walking away from a melee of bodies with a blade in his hand. The melee referred to consisted of a number of “have-a-go-heroes” who, having seemingly restrained the offender, were then ordered out of the way by armed police so that they could shoot him dead.

On the surface, the shooting and killing of Amman doesn’t look as much an obvious case of a despatching of a patsy in a psyop as does the shooting and killing of Usman Khan, but what makes the two events the same sort of thing are below the tip of the iceberg in the Amman case. A number of pieces of that sort of evidence will concern us as being the subject of this article, at least in part. Moreover, we must examine what this latest incident means for the culture of the paramilitary police (the Militia of the British State, which is ultimately pointed at the obstructionist general public – as explained here) whereby citizens who brandish knifes in public, and in a way that is deemed menacing, must be shot dead with no questions asked. In actual fact, it appears that the terror cases where this has happened are not truly representative, and so there is a benefit of terror to the British State by which it can present itself to public perception as being permitted to put aside the notion of the punishment fitting the crime, and thus creating expectation of being incontinent, or without restraint, in terms of the relationship between the paramilitary police and the people.

The least we can say about the Streatham incident is that, on the surface, it truly does indicate that the British State has forgotten how the punishment should fit the crime. Using guns on people who cannot shoot back should not be an issue of putting a potential offender down to render him harmless. In the UK, even murder does not carry the death penalty, so when police can shoot a suspect dead then the punishment never fits the crime. Indeed, Sudesh Amman hadn’t killed anyone. Indeed, there is a strong stink of a possibility that he didn’t even cause a single serious injury with a knife before he was shot dead – which would, of course, make the Met Police assistant commissioner Neil Basu’s contribution towards a narrative to explain the Amman case particularly disgusting. Using a talking point that has also appeared in corporate-media, and which has surely been concocted to provide rationalisation for a new kind of Islamist terror threat, Basu said that Amman could not be de-radicalised and had his heart set on martyrdom. Thus is summary execution meted out by the State justified, and it can only be that the British people have never been more stupid and/or timid than at any other point in history that there is not a huge furore about this incident.

Since the year 2000, 53 people have been killed by police extrajudicially (not all of these being summary execution). Some of these cases make interesting reading, especially the ones where victims were completely unarmed. Some cases appear to have no explanation at all, and with others it is hard to see where police could by justified with total lack of doubt. Of course, only rarely are the culprits found to be culpable in a case of unlawful killing; i.e. murder. Our focus is suspects being shot in the process of attacking with a knife, of which there are four cases as far as the author can see: three are cases of a single victim: Amman’s, Khan’s, and the case Khalid Masood, who was the man shot dead (other than PC Keith Palmer) during the Westminster Bridge attack of 2017 (covered here). The other case involved multiple suspect deaths and was the terror incident at London Bridge which is the subject of an FBEL series.

What strikes one as being incredibly telling is that although knife crime is supposed to be rampant, and especially in London, police are only around to shoot the suspect when the attack is being carried out by a terrorist. We don’t suppose, do we, that not having been shot, the many people who carry out knife attacks are never arrested and put in jail? They don’t get away scot free, do they? So maybe what this could tell us is that there is a reality where there are ways of rendering a knifeman harmless without having to shoot a gun at him. But then, we are not dealing with reality in these terror cases.

As for generic summary execution by police firearm, the first thing to do is to pre-emptively counter a possible argument that could be raised against what is stated in this article. 53 people killed extrajudicially since 2000 is a tiny proportion, so why is there a problem? Because for many cases where an explanation is supplied, the supposed mental illness of the victim is cited – and why this is of great concern should be self-explanatory. Moreover, the type of extrajudicial killing that is underrepresented in the figures is death in the course of prosecuting suspects of gun crime. Where it does appear, it often turns out that police have shot a person dead on the basis of their carrying a “toy” gun. Furthermore, the justification of prevention of terror is only founded on an illusion. On this basis, let us argue, then, there is little justification for police to carry firearms – or to qualify the statement, to carry them as routinely and pervasively as they do. So, in fact, 53 people killed extrajudically is a number too high.

Even if victims of police summary execution are few, it still doesn’t change the fact that the modern propensity of police to carry firearms is just indicative of incontinence that puts the general public at risk from “law enforcement” officials.  So what really lies at the heart of the problem whereby the Met Police can let off six rounds in a public place in the name of stopping a terrorist (as happpened at Streatham) is the lack of objection to armed police by the general public – and this is the unacceptable aspect of the whole issue. We can only expect UK police forces to be a law unto themselves because that would be a by-product of them being the chief agency that enforces Government policy irrespective of law. The police are like a wild animal that only knows its own instincts. If the husbandman – the people – do not apply a tether to stymie the natural tendencies of the animal, then he – they – only have themselves to blame. That there has been no outcry about the second extrajudicial killing of an alleged knifeman in three months is diabolical, and a disgrace, and a blistering indictment of the state of British society. The country is indeed in a state of post-civilisation.

The solution to the thuggery of the State without reference to justice is that citizens should be armed with their own guns. In this way the killing of a “terrorist” by a person within the situation of peril that has been created by the offender (i.e. a potential victim) would be lawful as self-defence. Much better it be this way than to have a situation where a police officer outside the situation who, when impressed with the idea that his role is to protect citizens, elevates his importance in relation with law. Suffice to say, it should be the citizen who deals with events in his own sphere of influence as they happen to him, and within this perimeter police should only be tolerated if invited in, or else be treated as much an antagonist as the criminal himself. Indeed, if citizens were armed, the police might not have been able to conduct themselves with the hubris that they did in the case of the Amman shooting – and this will be explained in the course of this article.

Having established the fact that, in law, the police are a long way away from their rights and responsibilities when they commit any extrajudicial killing, we will examine the particulars of the Amman case that show it wasn’t all that it seemed – and living in the era of relentless false flag terror attacks by British Government upon the citizenry, these things never are what they appear to be.

In Amman’s case, police were involved even before his “60-second rampage on a busy south London high street”, as the Guardian reported it; yes, dear reader, if a rampage within a minute is a possible thing, then it only exists in the hyperbole of corporate-media reportage. And where one sees this in respect an “act of terror” then there is good reason to be suspicious about the incident being reported.

The “rampage” began when Amman entered a shop, although there is distinct possibility that there had been a deal of incident prior to it in the manoeuvring of the 20-year-old into position, as certain information hints might have been the case. But as far as the attack being a supposedly organic event, however, it started in a shop where an eyewitness, who was also in the store, told the BBC (through a translator, of course) a very odd tale:

He came in and took a knife and he looked like he was leaving the shop. The owner thought he was going to stop by the cashier to pay. But … he pushed me, he tried to open and remove the plastic packaging from the knife, but he didn’t manage. He pushed and he stabbed me but the knife was still covered with plastic.

This is bombshell material that is nevertheless treated as a sideshow: an interesting account of the survival of an immigrant woman called Rosa (not her real name) from the Spanish Caribbean. The account does throw up an inconvenient fact, however: Amman didn’t take a knife along to the scene of an intended crime where he was supposed to attack people with such an instrument. To say it is a sticking point in the official narrative in an understatement. Notoriously, plastic packaging on knives and scissors are so difficult to open without a knife or a pair of scissors that it’s hard to believe that Amman could even access his weapon in the brief minute that he was able to operate. Little wonder that his were only two victims: a man was sent to hospital with serious wounds, but a woman – who, unlike her male counterpart, was identified by name – sustained what police described as “non-life-threatening injuries”. Even two weeks after the attack, the author can only find the woman’s name: Monika Luftner. Fascinatingly, Luftner’s injuries may not even be knife wounds. She was discharged from hospital on the evening of the same day as the attack. One is tempted to think that Luftner received paper cuts from the plastic packaging around Amman’s knife, and to believe that the male victim was an invented feature to justify the way police resolved the incident.

The reader would be a dull one indeed if he hasn’t already presumed that the reason that Amman’s “rampage” lasted one whole minute was because police were quickly on the scene. As it turns out, Amman was “under active [24-hour, covert] police surveillance at the time of the attack”. Met Police commissioner Cressida Dick, Britain’s most senior police officer (naturally), subsequently giving “evidence to the London Assembly Police and Crime Committee about general tactics used by counter-terror police”, as reported by the BBC, said that police were not “man-to-man marking” Amman, and that’s why they were unable to prevent Amman (or any other subject of close police scrutiny) from “being able to stab anybody ever”. Contrary to what Miss Dick says, it surely was the case that Amman was being marked – but only loosely enough to let him create a problem by which police could react. And it was the reaction for which police were surely tailing Amman.

The evidence that tells of a psychological operation goes deeper. Until January 23rd of this year, Amman had been in jail on “six charges of possessing documents containing terrorist information and seven of disseminating terrorist publications.” Needless to say, he was never found guilty of the charges in a court of law, but instead was jailed on his own admission of the crime. He was arrested in May 2018 “by armed officers on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack, although he was not ultimately charged with doing so.” The Crown Prosecution Service and the Met Police, in their consultations at the time, must have decided that an admission on those particular grounds would not be forthcoming. And so Amman ultimately got into trouble for sharing an “al-Qaeda magazine in a family WhatsApp group”, telling his siblings in a message that “the Islamic State is here to stay”. It’s possibly safe to say that Amman’s posts, apparently intended for the consumption of his siblings, were so innocuous that they would not have come to the attention of police if it wasn’t for a busybody “jihadwatch” blogger based in the Netherlands – and of course. Meanwhile, if you live in Britain and contact the police because you find yourself being burgled, then good luck with that.

Amman was subsequently jailed for three years and four months in November 2018. He was released automatically half way through his sentence (which included, it seems, time served between arrest and jailing), and according to terms explained in the FBEL article on Usman Khan (link above). What we should notice is that Amman must have been given a determinate sentence (indeed, as confirmed here), which is the alternative to a sentence where there is the possibility of early release on condition of parole. Now, if a person is not of the usual dim sort of character that populates the British Isles these days, he will have grabbed an idea from the BBC article (just linked to) so that it would appear to be a possibility that a determinate sentence has actually been designed to be offered to offenders in return for an admission of guilt. In other words, we can suppose that Amman (as many others may have done) got himself browbeaten into being labelled a terrorist for the purpose of mitigating the suffering that was presented as being in his future, but in doing so, put his life in the hands of the unscrupulous people who became his custodians. One could bet the house that, going into jail, Amman would not have required constant police watching on his release. This surveillance, of course, was – as stated above – for the benefit of allowing police a chance to react to something that he was about to do. But what would Amman do of his own volition? What could any fantasist be about to do on his own volition in those circumstances? The answer must be nothing at all. The motivation would all come from the people who had had the opportunity of his imprisonment to become his handlers (and as a matter of interest, please note that the Guardian reports that a certain Faraz Khan, Amman’s father, “never visited his son in prison during his sentence”).

The parallels with the Usman Khan case are of course all too apparent on two crucial points. Usman Khan was also released early from prison, from whence he was first sent upon the strength of his own admission.  As suggested above, it was the behaviour of the police, who shooed off a crowd around Usman Khan to obtain a clear shot, conjoined with the circumstances surrounding his prison time, that made the incident so clearly resemble a psyop. With this latest episode, we can’t say for certain that it was indisputably synthetic by dint of Amman not even having a weapon, even though we suspect it might be the case, so it lacks the obvious transparency of its counterpart.  Having said that, with the Amman case, there is a strong indication from corporate-media reportage of other activity on the periphery of the incident that suggests we have been given a glimpse of the deeper infrastructure beneath the surface that, again, betrays the incident as a certain psyop. Consider the following, for instance:

The BBC’s Daniel Sandford said the events appeared to unfold after witnesses saw an unmarked police car pull in front of another car near Streatham Common, forcing it to stop.

He said this could be linked to the subsequent stabbings and police shooting and it was possible somebody was stopped, before being followed by undercover officers.

What is being said here, if it is not clear, is that prior to the incident undercover police stopped a car that they then allowed to proceed, and which they followed. What is this about if police were supposed to be covertly following Amman?

Then there is the behaviour of undercover police, apparently caught on video (and reported by the BBC), that needs to be considered:

Videos shot by eyewitnesses show several plain-clothed police officers pulling on police caps while pointing their weapons at the dying suspect…

In today’s incident, onlooker videos suggest the police only spot the man’s hoax device after he has been shot and they approach him.

This suggests that police shot Amman while in plain clothes, and then, after the fact, presented their legitimate front by donning fragments of their uniform. It also suggests that police shot the suspect without being in possession of the knowledge that there was reason to do so because of a potential explosive device. The information makes it look as if the police shot the suspect reflexively, and as soon as they possibly could. One might argue that the police were caught on the hop, but this would probably be a misconstruction of the data. Bothering to identify as police after the shooting was surely about giving the incident a semblance of legitimacy in the eyes of the watching, and filming public. They surely did not want to appear as if they were hoodlums in a gang fight – although they barely divested themselves of that impression.

And here we can pick back up on the thread as to why the British public must be armed, and as a by-product restrict ability to commit extrajudicial killing: in such a system, police could not possibly dare to arrive at a place in undercover mode and start firing guns lest they be construed as villains themselves. Be that as it may, as much as the conduct of police who shot Amman makes it look as though there was intent to kill the suspect above any other consideration, it couldn’t be called an obvious case of “killing the patsy” above any other consideration. The behaviour could just indicate the shocking lack of respect that the police has for the public – a third victim of the incident was a woman hit by glass caused by the discharge of a weapon – and the arrogance of a class that knows it is above the law.

However, when the likes of Tony Cartalucci of straight-laced geo-political analysis LandDestroyer fame, writes that “The latest incident in London was so entirely preventable that it is difficult to describe it as anything less than deliberate”, it shows how transparent this phenomenon has become. There is a good case to make that with the Usman Khan case at first, and now the Amman case, we are seeing a pattern, and as much as one incident looks suspicious on its own, when another resembling it happens twice in short succession, one has to begin to suspect that there is a methodology at work: a programme. As such, there is little wonder that subsequently to the Streatham incident, the Telegraph produced a story, sourced from a jihadist-turned-MI6 agent (which is an admission of guilt if only people were awake to it), that would explain that de-radicalisation of terrorists doesn’t work. This would be the same de-radicalisation that we are to presume that Usman Khan and Amman are exposed to while in jail. But the timing of the emergence of a narrative that terrorists cannot be turned, and as Basu loathsomely put it, are hankering after martyrdom, is all too suspicious  as it coincides with the new phenomena of the released jihadists who gain freedom only to kill, or at least try to.

There are two levels of reason for incredulity. First of all, it’s not believable that, organically, during their time in prison, the likes of Amman and Khan have turned from fantasists and collectors and disseminators of questionable, but ultimately harmless information on the internet, to maniacs who cannot control an urge to plunge a knife into random people. Secondly, that the phenomenon of the early-release terrorist and its explanation are appearing simultaneously together is beyond the limits of coincidence.  And when one examines the programming of public perception that is contained in the Telegraph’s “ex-Al-Qaeda” story, one just knows that there is a roll out of a new phase of false-flag terror by Britain’s Military Intelligence agencies:

When Streatham attacker Sudesh Amman ran out of a high-street shop and began indiscriminately stabbing passersby last weekend, Aimen Dean worried that his prediction was coming true. A former al-Qaeda member turned MI6 spy, Dean had told me days beforehand of his certainty that the next big terror threat to civilian life was offenders leaving prison.

“They could form the next wave of lone wolf attacks in the UK,” said Dean, just over a week before the incident in south London. “It’s a problem we’re facing right now.”

Dean’s fears weren’t unfounded – it was the second such attack in as many months, following Usman Khan’s fatal stabbing of two people at an offender rehabilitation conference near London Bridge.

With the Government’s expectation management clearly identified, one barely even has to do the calculation for oneself whereby the two factors of far-fetchedness outlined immediately above are combined with the features of the incidents first in December, and now in February, to show that there is a new low budget version of false-flag terror. And the realisation to arrive at when confronted with this information is that it doesn’t matter if British Military intelligence are scraping the barrel in terms of paucity of talent – as was discussed in the article on Khan – and it doesn’t matter if the police are too stupid to participate in a believable fashion. What counts is the magnification of a scrap through the complicit corporate-media so that old ladies and football fans who have been plied with “War on Terror” propaganda for twenty years are given a matrix for continuity. Arguably, we are not far off a Nineteen Eighty Four scenario where there is no actual physical incidence of terror, but only its echo in corporate-media so that it appears real.

The next step, in that case, is to completely undermine the ability of the Government to impart power to its terror psyops through communications – which is something that this site has been working towards in its own small way for many years. Neutralising the Oz-like machinery that projects Greatness and Power is only the start, however. The goal must be the arrest and imprisonment of British security and justice system personnel who plan, execute, facilitate and even cover up these psyops. This is what we should be working for.